

# Principles of Peacetime Readiness

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*[Leadership] is an act of faith. In an age where no secret is sacred, where fabrications and false confidences are the stuff of daily life, [leadership] has retained its mystery... and never has it been talked about so much—the best possible proof of its power and enchant.<sup>1</sup>*

Christian Dior

In 1947, Christian Dior presented a collection of women's clothing that revolutionized the world. Almost overnight, women were slipping into clothes from his *New Look*. After wartime rationing, the conspicuous consumption embodied in the meters of material required for each outfit signalled the end of the lean, sleek, efficient wartime fashions. Concomitant with the civilian world's entry into a period of extravagant consumption, military leaders were "right sizing" their organizations so their countries could realize the "peace dividend," to use the modern vernacular.

Even after 5 March 1946, when the Right Honourable Sir Winston Churchill declared that an Iron Curtain had descended across Europe, signalling the start of the Cold War, countries continued to stand down from their wartime footing and commenced the evolution into peacetime militaries. With only a brief pause during the fledgling United Nations' policing action on the Korean peninsula, bureaucracies grew as the number of sailors, soldiers, and airmen diminished. It is not surprising that bureaucratic battles became the way admirals and generals won their promotions and positions.\* This is not a new phenomenon; the Comte de Guibert wrote about it in his general essay on tactics: "If by chance, there appears in a nation a good general, the politics of the ministers and the intrigues of the bureaucrats will take care to keep him away from the soldiers in peacetime. They prefer entrusting their soldiers to mediocre men, who are incapable of training them, but rather are passive and docile before all of their whims and within all of their systems... Once war begins, only disaster can force them to turn back to the good general."<sup>2</sup>

Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini also warned that "it is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to degenerate."<sup>3</sup> One way to combat this tendency would, of course, be to continue to find enemies to fight and keep our countries in a perpetual state of full-scale war. Few, however, would argue that the benefits to our militaries under this strategy would outweigh the costs to our societies. The question then remains: Short of continuous combat, how can we keep our militaries ready to fight while avoiding, or at least mitigating, the initial wartime disaster Guibert predicted?

From Sun Tzu to the present, many have written about the waging of war. Few, however, have provided guidance for structuring and training militaries during the intervals of peace we increasingly, and thankfully, find ourselves living through. The problem today is that ethicists tend to write only about ethics and values, political scientists about politics and policy, psychologists about individual leadership and organizational behaviour, and sociologists about society and culture. While these groups provide useful theoretical models, it is up to the members of the military profession—who ultimately must apply the various theories—to

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\* For a longer examination of this concept, see [The Dangers of Doctrine](#) in *The Baltic Defence Review* 5.

develop ways to integrate their guidance into our military organizations. The challenge for today's senior military leaders is to develop self-sustaining, learning organizations that will minimize the initial wartime slaughter that Guibert predicted. This paper will examine the guidance provided in the past, and then derive a set of Principles of Peacetime Readiness from the ideas and theories of educators, historians, ethicists, management gurus, psychologists, sociologists, leaders, and other academics. The better we focus our efforts during peacetime, the better we are prepared to plan and fight battles when called on to do so.

## The “Lantern on the Stern”<sup>4</sup>

Over the generations, military officers have developed theories about what is required to successfully prosecute war. These theories have become known as the principles of war. Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* was “the first known attempt to formulate a rational basis for the planning and conduct of military operations.”<sup>5</sup> Since that time, many others have either refined his work or independently developed their own concepts. Today, the principles of war have become standard fare at staff colleges around the globe. Different countries award importance to different numbers and different aspects of principles; however, there is some overlap among almost all of them. A review of principles of war from different countries reveals that France has the fewest (at three) and Canada and China tie with the most (eleven).<sup>\*</sup> We also see that only two principles—concentrating one's forces in action and surprise—appear on all lists. When working with coalitions, Major General Meille of the French Army advises us that “these principles can be applied differently depending on the operational situation, the personality of the commander, the experience and the nationality of [the coalition's] main assistants and collaborators.”<sup>6</sup>

What is common among countries is a feeling that there is a requirement for an aide-mémoire for planning to fight a campaign or battle. It should be noted that these principles are focused on planning battles and—except, perhaps, for Canada's inclusion of Administration—say little about how to prepare forces to fight that battle or how one's forces should be structured. Perhaps examining personal characteristics will provide us with a clearer framework.

Like the principles of war, there are many points of view on what is required to make up the perfect admiral or general. Jomini wrote: “The most essential qualities for a general will always be as follows: First, *A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions*; secondly, *A physical courage which takes no account of danger*. His scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries.”<sup>7</sup>

Some countries have delineated a list of characteristics required for a person to effectively exercise command. The British *Army Doctrine Publication* provides us with the following list of characteristics and traits such a person should have: leadership, professional knowledge, vision and intellect, courage and resolve, self-confidence, ability to communicate, integrity and example.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>\*</sup> A summary is presented at Annex A. The number of principles of war that a country chooses to adopt may, in and of itself, make for an interesting framework on which to evaluate its level of bureaucracy and organizational readiness, but that is a topic for another paper.

Once again, this is a useful list of elements to develop in our leaders, but they provide little guidance as to how to ensure that our leaders actually possess them or how to structure our military organizations and training systems to routinely develop them. We are still left with the question: How should we structure our forces in peacetime so as to avoid or mitigate a disaster during the first battles of the next war? Perhaps the lessons are in the past.

Not surprisingly, most people who write about military history write about tactics, doctrine, and the strategy of waging war; this is, after all, what militaries ultimately exist to do. Jomini did suggest that there are some things our militaries should have and do:

1. To have a good recruiting system;
2. A good organization;
3. A well-organized system of national reserves;
4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as well as those of a campaign;
5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the service;
6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;
7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;
8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to defensive and offensive arms;
9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of its officers;
10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general administration;
11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the principal operations of war;
12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.

To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and equipment; for, if this be a less direct importance on the field of battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and health of veterans.<sup>9</sup>

Our societies and militaries have developed considerably since Jomini provided us with this list. Advances in military technology continue to change the nature of the battle space, significantly complicating the task of training our officers and non-commissioned members. The entry of non-state actors into the arena of conflict confuses the very definition of war. The spread of democracy has created corps of commissioned and non-commissioned members no longer willing to live with the “theirs not to make reply, / theirs not to reason why, / theirs but to do and die”<sup>10</sup> standard; while they are still willing to ride “into the jaws of Death,”<sup>11</sup> they expect a say in how they are governed and led to that threshold. All these elements have created revolutions in our military affairs\*—at least equal to those in our civil societies—that Jomini could hardly have predicted. Concomitant with the technological changes that have occurred over the last 200 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the study and development of management and leadership models in the civilian (mainly business) community.

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\* There has been plenty of debate about whether there has been a revolution in military affairs, an evolution in military affairs, or a simple progression of activity and development. I would argue that there is an ongoing revolution in military affairs, but perhaps not in the manner meant by most. The Oxford Concise English dictionary includes the following definition for revolution: “motion in orbit or a circular course; rotation.” This, I submit, is the true revolution in military affairs. With all the talk of lessons learned, we would probably be more accurate in describing most of them as lessons *re*-learned.

Although leadership and management go back to ancient times, they only became a field of specialized study in the early part of the last century. Historically, management and leadership theorists looked to the military for their role models. People like Frederick W. Taylor, Henry Fayol, Max Weber and others fashioned the classical management model from the authoritarian, rigidly structured leadership and management style used in the military. During the early 1930s, the human relations management theory emerged, based mainly on research conducted by Elton Mayo at the Hawthorn Works of the Western Electric Company. Mayo's studies were the first to methodically explore the role of personality and human psychological processes in the work environment. Mayo and his researchers concluded that workers wanted more than just money from their jobs, and that effective management required social as well as technical skills. Today, Modern Systems and Contingency Management views the organization as a total system with complex interactions both internally and externally. This recognises that each organization is unique and that no one organizational system will be appropriate in all situations.<sup>12</sup> The military has lagged behind in the development of management and leadership theory and models.

Looking at the past, we find that there are few guiding principles for peacetime militaries that can act as a corollary to the guidance provided by the principles of war during times of conflict. So, the question posed above still remains: Short of continuous combat, how can we keep our militaries ready to fight while avoiding, or at least mitigating, the initial wartime disaster Guibert predicted?

While the requirements of military and civilian leadership are different, they are not mutually exclusive. In an attempt to learn from others' mistakes and view our organizations from a different perspective, we will look to the civilian world to help us formulate our principles. The five principles we will examine are: professional engagement, innovation, ethical clarity, probity, and cultural health.

## ***Professional Engagement***

*My vision of the future is...of individuals passing from one stage of independence to a higher, by means of their own activity, through their own effort of will, which constitutes the inner evolution of the individual.*<sup>13</sup>

*Maria Montessori*

Life-long learning programs help develop individuals. While professions do need to ensure that their members are current and capable, more important for their long-term health is that they continuously expand and refine their professional body of knowledge through their own efforts of will. Some suggest that life-long learning is the key to organizational health. Life-long learning is a solitary endeavour—an individual engaged, all too often, in the arid transmission of knowledge—even when he or she shares a classroom with other students. The military profession, like all professions, requires the practical application of knowledge to accomplish specific goals, and is therefore by its very nature not a primarily academic endeavour. Our learning therefore must remain focused on our vocation, although some academic rigour will be required as well.

The applied professions—engineering, medicine, et cetera—all have a strong link to an adjunct academic group. Today, the military profession seems, along with most of society, to be

almost overtaken by technological advances, but it is history that provides us with lessons of strategy and tactics that must guide our use of these new technologies.\* Our history is the one field that must be studied to develop our professional body of knowledge and to understand the essence of the leadership challenges that face us. Used wisely, the lessons of the past can assist those of us who will be called upon to practice the management of violence so that we can develop useful models and theories to aid in future warfare. We must be mindful of Samuel Coleridge's observation: "If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives us is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us."<sup>14</sup>

Those who study and theorize about war generally represent two broad groups. First are those who prepare for the challenges of battle and warfare—members of the military. Second are those who theorize about or study war because they have an interest in military history—academics. These two groups have distinctly different goals. The former primarily seek the most effective and efficient ways to carry out the orders of their superiors and attain victory in the battle space. The latter seek to expand the known by exploring and recounting the past. Because these two groups have different goals, they view history—and each other—in distinctly different ways. If we rationalize the views of these two groups, our history can become a powerful tool for our defence structure and our nations.

Each group has something to offer the other; however, too often their different goals stifle what should be an open dialogue and co-operative relationship. A systemic and reciprocal relationship could lead to useful theories, thoughts, and ideas that would help win or avoid war or other fighting that spans the spectrum of conflict, and hence support our national interests by providing greater national security. Failure to build a systemic, reciprocal relationship between these two groups will mean that useful ideas will continue to simply be lanterns on the stern, ignored or unseen by those who could use them to greatest effect.

The conflict between these two groups starts with the way that they view each other. Academics tend to treat the military's principles of war with a certain disdain and have tried to marginalize them. For instance, Paret described the influence of the principles of war on military thinking as having "served generations of soldiers as an excuse not to think things through for themselves."<sup>15</sup>

Equally, military officers ignore the work done by academics. Henry Lloyd summed this up by saying that "the moderns, who have undertaken to write the history of different wars, or of some renowned Commanders, being chiefly men of learning only, and utterly unacquainted with the nature of military operations, have given us indeed agreeable, but useless productions."<sup>16</sup>

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\* Some might argue that defence scientists, political scientists, and policy analysts hold equal claim to status as adjunct academic groups for the military profession. I would respond that here, I mean history in its largest sense, the total accumulation of past events, of which technological and policy changes are a part. Further, one of the things that generally distinguishes democracies from dictatorships is the concept of civilian control of the military. This means that military input into government policy should be limited to providing analysis of the impact of government policy on the military structure. For instance, providing input on the cost of various government policies in capital, operations and maintenance funds, and lives, or providing advice on military options available to accomplish defined strategic goals. While scientists may provide us with tools, the lessons of history will provide us with the knowledge required to evaluate the most efficient way to use those tools to accomplish our military aim.

Both of these groups use historic examples to support their ideas and theories, but because they view each other with at best professional superciliousness, they rarely benefit from each other's insights. By merging the problem-solving, results-oriented skills and intellectual output of both groups, our countries would realize great benefits.

Both historians and military officers (and hence our nations) can benefit from the combined experience and intellectual power that these two seemingly disparate groups bring to the study of warfare. Military officers, being focused on present and future warfare or preparations for the same, tend to engage in superficial reviews of historical data to prove their theories. This is dangerous because "it is well known that military history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of any theory or opinion."<sup>17</sup> The information, ideas, and theories that could help these military officers more rigorously examine their own models are unavailable to them because "historians are inclined to write for each other."<sup>18</sup> The challenge, therefore, is for military officers to develop their understanding of historical analysis and to encourage military historians to engage a wider audience in their writings. Through this process, both communities would see that there is an opportunity for mutual benefit rather than the current state of mutual distrust or disdain. Models already exist for the development of such a symbiotic relationship.

In the scientific realm, physicists, chemists, and biologists observe the world around them in an attempt to discover how and why it works the way it does. The scientists then publish their work. Once published, engineers—the applied scientists—and doctors—the applied biologists—use these observations, theories and ideas to solve the practical problems presented to them. The dialogue between these two different but closely related groups was built over many generations.

At the other end of the spectrum, a similar model exists in the arts. Painters, sculptors, musicians, and writers observe the world around them and produce works that symbolize what they consider important from those observations. Periodically a new "school" will develop when groups of artists witness similar changes in their societies. Applied artists—fashion designers, graphic artists, architects, et cetera—take these artistic techniques, styles and symbols and use them to produce tangible objects to fulfill specific practical uses. Once again, the relationship between these two groups has been built over many generations.

A similar systemic dialogue does not yet exist between military historians, who gather the threads of history, and military officers, who spin the threads into practical tools, tactics, and strategies for fighting wars. Developing a deeper understanding of history, an expanded awareness of past lessons, and how these past ideas influenced the practical problem of warfare in their time, will help us build a stronger officer corps for the future. In essence: "Leadership...is strengthened and more effective when leaders at all levels know about and understand the implications of trends, developments and new ideas."<sup>19</sup> Visionaries in both communities must search for examples in the past that will help us develop our leaders in the future. By developing a strong systemic dialogue between the two groups who study and theorize about war, we can create enduring trust, respect and co-operation that will inspire those who follow, and create a strong learning organization.

In order for the military profession and our own militaries to remain viable, we must recreate ourselves as learning organizations. Having members of the profession engaged in life-

long learning is a good start, but it will not in and of itself ensure the long-term health of our profession, and hence the long-term security of our nations. In order for our profession to evolve into a learning organization, we as individuals must evolve past the life-long learning plateau and become life-long teachers. While it is important to have strong ties to our profession's adjunct academics, who provide the profession with data and insight, it is the members of the profession who must take that information, turn it into knowledge, and apply that knowledge when solving practical problems both in and out of the battle space. It is the members of the military profession who bear the responsibility of command, and hence for the lives of our subordinates—not the professors who teach us our history, math and other courses. When members of the profession engage in life-long teaching, they encourage the growth of a broader, better-informed, robust professional community. In short, they create a learning organization.

The transition from life-long learning to life-long teaching, however, will require most of us to change the way we respond in different circumstances. It will also require organizational structures to change, because life-long teaching also requires us to learn from our superiors, peers, and subordinates as the situation dictates. Given the traditionally hierarchical structures of military organizations, there is bound to be some defensiveness when superiors are faced with situations in which they must acknowledge that their subordinates have more experience than they. “Teaching people how to reason about their behaviour in new and more effective ways breaks down the defences that block learning,”<sup>20</sup> and it is these defences that will limit our ability to share experiences that will help strengthen our profession. Once we have military members who are professionally engaged, we need to develop and encourage innovation so that our whole organization can develop and move forward with the least possible waste of energy.

## ***Innovation***

*The most grievous danger for any Pope lies in the fact that encompassed as he is by flatterers; he never hears the truth about his own person and ends by not wishing to hear it.*<sup>21</sup>

*Pope Alexander IV*

Innovation is more than creativity. Being creative means that you are “inventive and imaginative.”<sup>22</sup> Having a creative mind is all well and good, but we belong to a practical profession that must accomplish real-world tasks. In this paper, “innovation” is used to mean “applied creativity,” id est, having a novel idea and then implementing it. Of course, for our militaries to be innovative, we must develop people who can produce original ideas. The issue facing us is how to develop our organizations to allow these creative people to thrive. Since implementing inventive and imaginative ideas by definition means changing the way things are done, those who engage in this activity will be disruptive.

Encouraging and supporting people who dissent from the status quo will be the biggest challenge for our military organizations, which seem to prize obedience and hierarchy above almost all else. Especially in peacetime, with governments keenly watching expenditures and the media searching for government waste, taking the risk of trying new ways of doing business will be a leadership challenge difficult for some to conquer. If we succeed in encouraging innovation, we can lead our militaries into an era where “for the first time in history we can work backward from our imagination rather than forward from our past.”<sup>23</sup> Supporting dissent is the basic building block for creating an innovative organization.

Like so many other things, dissent has both positive and negative characteristics and outcomes. Positive dissent is more than simply saying, “This is wrong.” It involves defining the problem, proposing a viable solution, and then working toward implementation. As leaders, we must use our positional authority to protect and encourage the innovative people who work for us. Those who are comfortable with the status quo will, among other things, try to label innovators as troublemakers and malcontents. “ ‘What the defenders of orthodoxy see as subversive, the champions of new thinking see as enlightenment.’ [Gary Hamel] points out that dissenters are subversive, but their goal is not subversion.”<sup>24</sup> A person who dissents for the purpose of innovation is doing so to benefit the organization and not simply for personal gain. Those opposed to change will attempt to throw up as many roadblocks as they can.

Our militaries respect and revere tradition; this means that, especially for our organizations, “one of the hardest things...[will be] getting people to accept that the way they work just might not be the best [way].”<sup>25</sup> Military organizations face many challenges when trying to build an innovative culture. The flow of emotions will be strong. As leaders, we must prepare to deal with “the dangerous brew of fear and complacency—[the desire to stay] where [we] are out of fear of failing, of blowing too much money, or of placing the wrong bets”<sup>26</sup> that we and our subordinates will feel. The military’s strong sense of community and experience in dealing with similar strong emotions in the battle space will stand us in good stead, but also bring with them some drawbacks.

Richard Florida, Robert Cushing, and Gary Gates in their paper When Social Capital Stifles Innovation present research to show that in cultures where group relationships are highly valued, “relationships can get so strong that the community becomes complacent and insulated from outside information and challenges. Strong ties can also promote the sort of conformity that undermines innovation.”<sup>27</sup> Individuals in these strong social groups may be wary of upsetting the rest of the group, something that will certainly occur when they try to change the way things are done or challenge long-held beliefs. The way the group reacts will be strongly influenced by its leaders. If they ridicule and shun the dissenter, new ideas are not likely to be brought forward in the future. Achieving acceptance for these dissenters will require most of us to change the way we respond in various situations.

Leading disruptive change is difficult for even the most liberal of organizations. The established hierarchy of the military and our reliance on doctrine and standard operating procedures makes the challenge for us especially difficult. As leaders, we must realize that dissenters are providing us with indications of impending adaptive challenges. As such, we must “provide cover to people who point to the internal contradictions of the enterprise. Those individuals often have the perspective to provoke rethinking that people in authority do not.”<sup>28</sup> Once the areas requiring change are identified, it can take time—sometimes years—to change doctrine even when everyone acknowledges that the change needs to happen. Clayton M. Christensen and Michael Overdorf in Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change warn: “It’s no wonder that innovation is so difficult for established firms. They employ highly capable people—and then set them to work within processes and business models that doom them to failure.”<sup>29</sup> In addition to the systems, we may have problems changing the behaviours of the very people who must adapt first: our senior leaders.



While it is generally good that our leaders have risen to their current positions based on merit, the road taken—especially in risk-averse, bureaucratic peacetime organizations—most often means that they have rarely openly admitted failure. Generally, they have either avoided failure by not taking risks, or rationalized failures when they occurred. “Because they have rarely failed, they have never learned how to learn from failure.”<sup>30</sup> Instead, they have likely developed defensive reasoning mechanisms designed to shield them from having to change the way they perform. “What’s more, those members of the organization that many assume to be the best at learning are, in fact, not very good at it. I am talking about the well-educated, high-powered, high-commitment professionals who occupy key leadership positions in the modern corporation.”<sup>31</sup> We can see that it will take a strong desire and a strong will to make this change occur. To facilitate modeling this change, let’s look at some tools we can use to plot our course.

As with all significant leadership challenges, the “experimentation has to start at the top.”<sup>32</sup> But where do we begin? Gary Hamel suggests the model of Silicon Valley. The people and organizations in Silicon Valley bring to market a breathtaking number of innovative products every year—everything from computer games to robot pets to business software. “Those who populate Silicon Valley don’t have brains the size of basketballs. They don’t live in some special energy field. What sets the Valley apart is not its people or its climate but the way of doing business... There are none of the numbing bureaucratic controls that paralyze creativity in traditional businesses.”<sup>33</sup> In his paper Bringing Silicon Valley Inside, Hamel posits that dynamic markets for ideas, capital, and talent are the elements that make Silicon Valley so innovative.<sup>34</sup>

How to translate these elements into a military ethos that retains a need for hierarchy and obedience in at least part of its actions is the great challenge. This will vary from country to country depending on the current organizational structure and cultural norms.

Since militaries don’t generally have the option of hiring people from outside the organization to bring new ideas or practices to the culture, building an internal market for talent may be the most difficult challenge. Let me suggest that developing personnel systems that give individuals predominant control over their postings would provide a means of developing an internal talent market and allow us to reap the benefits described by Hamel. Rather than having centralized postings control, commanders would compete to lure people to come work for them. Commanders who failed to lead their people might find it difficult to recruit talented individuals to their organizations. If certain organizations had problems finding staff, it could indicate to senior leaders that the commander had risen above his or her leadership capabilities.

Establishing a market for capital could be far easier than establishing a market for talent. By no means do I intend to suggest that organizations throw all of their money on the table for everyone’s pet projects. For militaries required to account to the government and public, this would be impossible to justify. Rather, I suggest we identify a portion of the overall budget that can be used to implement new ideas or practices. Then allow all members of the organization to put forward projects and apportion the money accordingly. Brilliant ideas are not the sole prerogative of senior leaders, and hence all members should be given a shot at the money. Obviously, a corporal lacks the positional authority to implement major organizational redesigns, but he or she may require seed money to develop a new procedure that is within his/her sphere of

influence. Monitoring the implementation of small projects can also give leaders a good measuring tool, indicating potential for career progression.

Remember, however, that success should not be the only meter stick. If the initial idea does not work as planned, what the individual and the organization learned from the failure and how they adjust their plans is just as important as, if not more than, the plan's initial success or failure.

Since we have defined innovation as applied creativity, the suggestion is not that we throw out all of our current management, command, and control systems in favour of organizational anarchy. "For innovation to be reliable, it needs to be addressed systematically, like any business issue in which you define the problem and then solve it: What do we want to accomplish, and how? What resources will we need? Who will be on the team? How do we motivate and reward them? And how will we measure success?"<sup>35</sup> Before we reach this stage, however, we must ensure that our organizations are ready to accept the challenge. We must have people willing to bring forward new and possibly unpopular ideas.

The necessity for military organizations to be innovative comes down to the fact that if we continue to do the same things we have always done, we will become predictable. Predictable military forces cause people to be needlessly killed in battle. In short, for military organizations, quite literally "those who live by the sword will be shot by those who don't."<sup>36</sup> Building an innovative organization will help us develop past our historic constraints.

## ***Ethical Clarity***

*Ethical theory and applied ethics are closely related: theory without application is sterile and useless, but action without a theoretical perspective is blind.*<sup>37</sup>

*Louis P. Pojman*

Recently, much has been said about values and ethics in the business world. A business organization looks at its definition of values as a way to differentiate itself from other companies in order to derive a competitive advantage in the quest for profit. Militaries, on the other hand, seek to define values to save the lives of their members and the civilian citizens they are sworn to protect. To a large extent, our values also assist us in maintaining the psychological well being of the people in our organizations. Knowing that, even in war, there are things that we will not be asked to do provides us with a certain psychological comfort.

The boundaries on behaviour that militaries establish sometimes comprise a thin, easily cracked veneer. In his novel *Lord of the Flies*, William Golding provides us with a masterful study of both the ease with which humanity can shed its veneer of civilization when confronted with fear and the role of military officers in maintaining that veneer. Golding presents a story of a group of British schoolchildren left to fend for themselves on an uninhabited island. Frightened and alone in unfamiliar surroundings, forced to kill—in their case animals—in order to survive, we can see many parallels with militaries in battle. Golding shows us that "Beelzebub's ascendancy proceeds through fear, hysteria, violence, and death"<sup>38</sup>—all elements that are commonplace for militaries during battle.

One of the main roles of a military's value system is to help combat the erosion of civilization's veneer and sustain the humanity of our people; however, "civilization's power is weak and vulnerable to atavistic, volcanic passion."<sup>39</sup> It is the responsibility of military officers to establish rules and processes that will prevent the breakdown of civilization's power. In the closing scene of *Lord of the Flies*, it is a naval officer who steps in and re-establishes the rule of civilization among the group. This provides a strong reminder of our ongoing role in the heat of battle. A responsible leader "is one of the things that distinguishes a mob from a people. He maintains the level of individuals. Too few individuals, and a people reverts to a mob."<sup>40</sup> By ensuring that our subordinates remember to reason as individuals rather than allowing themselves to be subsumed by group think we can ensure that our military units don't become mobs. How then should leaders maintain the required level of individuals and clearly establish the presence of civilization in an organization established to apply violence on behalf of its country? Before we address that question, let's examine other ways in which values affect our organizations.

When we establish a set of values, we must remember why we are doing it. "Values initiatives have nothing to do with building consensus—they're about imposing a set of fundamental, strategically sound beliefs on a broad group of people."<sup>41</sup> Forcing people to conform to an established set of values will not be painless. Some will feel like outcasts. Many will have to modify their behaviours, if not their beliefs. Values initiatives also "limit an organization's strategic and operational freedom and constrain the behaviour of its people. They leave executives open to heavy criticism for even minor violations. And they demand constant vigilance."<sup>42</sup>

Why would any organization inflict this pain on itself? Values carry strong benefits. "They serve as fixed points. They determine what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate on a universal basis, every time."<sup>43</sup> When a ship leaves harbour, her crew must use known points to fix her position. Whether they are heavenly bodies, fixed points of land, or orbiting Global Positioning System satellites, these known points allow the crew to determine where they are and how to plot a course to their destination. In her paper Ethics, Virtuousness, and Constant Change, Professor Kim Cameron presents the results of several studies that relate organizational virtuousness with performance. Evaluation of the results leads to the conclusion that "organizations with high scores on virtuousness significantly outperform organizations with low scores on virtuousness."<sup>44</sup> She concluded that more virtuous firms made more money, recovered from downsizing faster, retained customers and employees more effectively, and were more innovative than non-virtuous firms. The studies looked at values such as compassion, integrity, forgiveness, trust, and optimism when evaluating the virtuousness of the organizations.<sup>45</sup> Defining what values we want, however, will be easier than creating a code of behaviour that encourages these actions.

Establishing a set of governing values that guide ethical reasoning may provide a more robust ethical culture than trying to regulate behaviour with rules and codes. Malham M. Wakin warns us that "The immature or unsophisticated frequently narrow their ethical sights to the behaviour specifically delineated in the code so that what may have originally been intended as a minimum listing becomes treated as an exhaustive guide for ethical action."<sup>46</sup> One of certainly many contributing factors to the recent crisis of corporate leadership in the United States of America was the rule-based legal and accounting systems that let companies find loopholes that

they could exploit to accomplish their nefarious desires while still sticking to the letter of the law. Since they seemed focused on following the rules, they never stepped back and asked whether the path they were taking led to a beneficial destination.<sup>47</sup>

Outlined above are some values that might be appropriate for our militaries; however, we must recognize that our organizations exist for different reasons than do businesses, and use different means than do other government bodies to accomplish our ends. For this reason, an organizational value such as “do not kill without sanction” may be appropriate on our list. Because ultimately we may be asked to kill for our country—and hence the outcomes of our decisions are significantly direr—encouraging ethical reasoning, rather than dictating conduct, may provide a more effective road to follow.<sup>\*\*</sup>

As was examined above, developing and enforcing a set of values in an organization can cause pain. One way some try to avoid this pain is to develop vague or unenforced—or even unenforceable—sets of values.<sup>\*</sup> Some leaders consider these kinds of statements to be harmless, but in actuality “they’re often highly destructive. Empty values statements create cynical and dispirited employees, ...and undermine managerial credibility.”<sup>48</sup> Alternatively some organizations try to cover all possible contingencies, thus creating complex codes of behaviour. Overly complex value statements can lead to confusion, having them ignored, or seeing employees use them to justify whatever actions they wish to take. James Baker cautions that we should be alert to “decisions that follow the letter of the law but violate the spirit of the law. [For instance] accounting rules today are so esoteric and difficult to understand that you might be literally within the legal constraints of a particular rule—but way outside its spirit.”<sup>49</sup>

As James Wilson said in *The Moral Sense*, “I am a bit suspicious of any theory that says that the highest moral stage is one in which people talk like college professors.”<sup>50</sup> We do need the theoretical perspective, but as members of militaries we must use that perspective to help focus our daily actions.

Unlike our doctrine, tactics, and standard operating procedures, which change based on the level of education and training in our organizations, and on changes in technology, our values must remain relatively constant. Like all things involved with organizational leadership, they should be regularly reviewed and clarified as required, but fundamental change or amendment should be rare. “Developing a Teachable Point of View is a critical step for any leader, but especially when essential topics such as ethics... must be demonstrated and communicated to an organization.”<sup>51</sup> In order to understand how to develop our ethical teachable point of view, it may be useful to understand something of our ethical development.

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<sup>\*\*</sup> In this paper, I do not intend to enter into the debate about what values should and should not be part of the military culture of each country. I will simply say that while I rejoice in the wealth of cultural differences between peoples, I reject that the benefits of diversity extend into the moral realm. Human morality is exactly that; *id est*, ethical standards are the same for all humans. Unlike the moral blank cheque espoused by moral relativism, I think we must judge others’ moral behaviour—and stand ready to be judged ourselves—then act on those judgements. Of course, being careful to distinguish between morality and custom is crucial in this realm. What is important is for the military profession to understand the importance of establishing clear ethical standards for our organizations.

<sup>\*</sup> For a sample of this type of values set, see Canada’s *Statement of Defence Ethics* at [http://www.dnd.ca/crs/ethics/pages/statem\\_e.htm](http://www.dnd.ca/crs/ethics/pages/statem_e.htm)

As we mature, our cognitive and physical abilities develop together. Just as our mobility develops from crawling to walking to running, so there are developmental stages in our moral reasoning. Lawrence Kohlberg, in his model describing moral development, defines three stages: preconventional morality, conventional morality, and postconventional morality. We tend to move from preconventional (“I’d better act a certain way or I’ll get into trouble”) to conventional (“we need to accomplish a task together; therefore, I’ll uphold the rules”) in early adolescence. While there is some debate over Kohlberg’s postconventional stage,<sup>\*</sup> we enter it when we begin to balance individual rights against the desires of the groups or societies that we belong to. This tends to occur in late adolescence.<sup>52</sup> Since most of our recruits join the military as they are entering the postconventional moral development phase, we have the opportunity and responsibility to help them develop their moral reasoning. A clearly defined ethical system is fundamental to accomplishing that goal, and as we have seen can also have other positive organizational benefits. How we can achieve this, as well as determining whether our stated values reflect the reality within our militaries, forms a large portion of the next principle of organizational readiness.

## **Probity**

*It is a delightful harmony when doing and saying go together.*<sup>53</sup>

*Michel Eyquem de Montaigne*

We see that, since militaries tend to recruit from our countries’ respective pools of adolescents, we have a significant ability—and responsibility—to mould the moral reasoning of our people. Our teachable point of view is best presented by example. “In the end, in business as in politics, credibility is hard to acquire, but very easy to lose.”<sup>54</sup> Defining and communicating a clear set of values is useless unless we also take action to ensure that they are firmly rooted in our military’s culture and followed by all members of the organization.

Probity means uprightness and honesty.<sup>55</sup> As leaders in the military profession, it is not enough to simply be personally honest and upright. We must ensure that our organizations—more specifically every individual within the military—act in a moral and upright fashion.

Living up to our stated values can be challenging. There may be political, financial, and social pressures to cut corners. “It’s much harder to be clear and unapologetic for what you stand for than to cave in to politically correct pressures,”<sup>56</sup> but it is vital if we wish to maintain a healthy moral climate in our militaries. “The test [of our leaders] should be moral courage.... Resolution and valour, not that which is sharpened by ambition but that which wisdom and reason may implant in a well ordered soul.”<sup>57</sup>

Many organisations have value statements posted on their walls. What happens when they fail to live by these values has been recently experienced in the United States. The bankruptcy of Enron Corporation demonstrated some great ironies for those examining values systems and statements. In its 2000 annual report, Enron listed its values as communication, respect, integrity, and excellence. Further, it said, “We have an obligation to communicate.

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<sup>\*</sup> The postconventional stage tends to appear most often in the educated of European and North American and hence is claimed by some to be biased against those cultures that don’t prize individual rights as highly as this group does.

Here, we take the time to talk with one another... and listen. We believe that information is meant to move and that information moves people.”<sup>58</sup>

In August 2001, Sherron Watkins (Enron’s VP for Corporate Development) warned Ken Lay (Enron’s CEO) that there were financial problems stemming from “a wave of accounting scandals.”<sup>59</sup> Notwithstanding the company’s stated value of communication, Lay promoted *to his own employees* and to the general investing community the purchases of company stock. When the company finally declared bankruptcy, thousands of people, particularly those who had company 401(k) plans, lost a significant chunk of their life savings.\* While there are certainly lessons to be learned from this incident, there are perhaps more direct parallels to be drawn from the case of Enron’s auditors, Arthur Andersen LLP.

There is little evidence to show that Enron ever took its stated values seriously. However, Arthur Andersen had a long history of operating under a strong moral compass. Within a year of opening his accounting firm, Arthur Andersen refused to certify the books of a client railroad. Andersen lost the client but provided the example that developed into the company’s value of independence. For decades, the firm inculcated this value into its employees, partners, and corporate structure. Exactly when it started to drift away from this core value is debatable, but it was clearly occurring throughout the 1990s. When Arthur Andersen signed off on Enron’s financial statements for the year 2000 that, in October 2001, had to be corrected, reducing company worth by US\$1.2 billion, Andersen signed its own death warrant. Its conviction for obstruction of justice and the eventual demise of the company was preordained.

Ironically, the same principles that helped Arthur Andersen build a strong ethical compass into its employees also sowed the seeds of its demise. “Like many visionary firms that expend considerable energy and resources to preserve their core, Arthur Andersen recruited young, trained heavily, and fostered a culture that bred a sense of upholding a higher responsibility to the investing public.”<sup>60</sup> Dubbed “androids” by non-Andersen employees, a culture of obedience to rules and the leader was encouraged and fostered. “When the rules and leaders stood for decency and integrity, the lockstep culture was the key to competence and respectability,” wrote Barbara Ley Toffler, partner-in-charge of the ethics and responsible business practices group at Andersen from 1995 to 1999. “When the game and the leaders changed direction, the culture of conformity led to disaster.”<sup>61</sup>

Andersen had no structure in place to allow people to question the moral integrity of the leaders, so they led the company to ruin. If Andersen had fulfilled its role as auditor, perhaps Enron would not have been forced to declare bankruptcy. While it is a tragedy that so many lost large amounts of their retirement savings, they can recover from this given time and prudent investing. When military organizations stray from their core values, people don’t lose their life savings—they lose their lives. An important point in this case is that Andersen’s leaders knew they could sculpt the ethical beliefs of their associates, and originally set out to do just that.

Above, we examined Kohlberg’s stages of moral development and discovered that we bring recruits in at the very time they are developing the beginnings of postconventional

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\* There were numerous complaints that so large a percentage of the 401(k) (a tax deferral retirement savings plan) funds were invested in Enron stock after the bankruptcy announcement. Since the complaints were not so loud when the stock soared through the \$100 mark, they can justifiably be seen as somewhat disingenuous.

reasoning. If they do not routinely see examples of organizational members who live by the stated values, this will model their moral behaviour in ways that our countries might live to regret decades down the line. We have it within our power to model their moral development along just and caring lines. When role models and leaders “practice what they preach, their moral principles have an impact. Such was true of the caring parents of those who courageously protected Jews in Nazi Europe.... And when acted upon, moral ideas grow stronger. We are as likely to act ourselves into a way of thinking as to think ourselves into action. To stand up and be counted, to explain and defend our convictions, to commit money and energy is to believe our convictions even more strongly.”<sup>62</sup> Only by believing in our convictions can we mould our militaries into the kinds of organizations that will make our countries proud, rather than embarrassing them on the international stage.\*

We need to develop people who have what “the romantic in Clausewitz called... ‘an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.’ ”<sup>63</sup> Over the last few decades, members of militaries from countries otherwise thought to be progressive, cultured, and civilised have committed acts that have brought shame and disgrace upon them.\*\*

In short, “integrity, compassion, and trust... create an environment where people are encouraged to be their best, where innovativeness, loyalty, and quality are likely to be higher. That’s the virtue cycle. The amplifying nature of virtuousness causes it to reproduce itself and to improve organizational performance over time.”<sup>64</sup> We might do well to remember the advice of Gianfrancesco Pico Iella Mirandola: “If we are to win back the enemy and the apostate to our faith, it is more important to restore fallen morality to its ancient rule of virtue than that we should sweep with our fleet the Eurine Sea.”<sup>65</sup> Of course, it would be much better if we act to maintain our military’s moral standing before it falls and needs restoration.

## **Cultural Health**

*“She asked me to tell her what it is to rule,” Paul said. “And I said that one commands. And she said I had some unlearning to do.... She said a ruler must learn to persuade and not to compel. She said he must lay the best coffee hearth to attract the finest men.”<sup>66</sup>*

*Frank Herbert*

Militaries fundamentally exist to protect the citizens, interests, and values of the society and country they serve. Two of the first questions we need to honestly answer in order to determine the cultural health of our military are: Do we reflect the society that we serve, and are we a credit to that society?

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\* Several recent examples come to mind, perhaps exemplified most recently by the actions of Major Harry Schmidt, and to a lesser extent his squadron commander Major William Umbach, of the Illinois Air National Guard. Major Schmidt, according to the report of the U.S. Board of Inquiry (BOI), killed four Canadian soldiers by bombing their position after failing to follow existing rules of engagement, not following standard operating procedure, and ignoring an order to hold fire. Notwithstanding the evidence presented to both the BOI and the judge at the Article 51 hearing, the command authority announced that it would not proceed with the charges (four counts of manslaughter, eight counts of assault, and one count of dereliction of duty) laid against Major Schmidt. Of course, some might argue that this seems to say more about the moral compass of the U.S. Air Force’s senior leaders than it does about Major Schmidt.

\*\* For instance the Canadian Airborne’s actions in Somalia.

Whether or not our subordinates are willing and able to provide us with answers to these questions will also indicate the condition of our organization's culture. Strong internal voices, indicating an innovative culture, will also be able to raise and openly debate ethical issues. With weakened internal voices, our military's ability to hear internal and societal concerns will be diminished, thus leading to its ossification. Listening to these voices will help us reflect the values and goals of our parent society.

These internal voices can be silenced in many subtle ways. One of the most common is by supervisors who avoid conflict by accentuating the positive and avoiding discussions about negative issues within their work groups. "The emphasis on being positive condescendingly assumes that employees can only function in a cheerful world, even if the cheer is false."<sup>67</sup>

B. W. Tuchman, a pioneer of group-development theory, developed what today is the standard four-phase model of team development: forming, storming, norming, and performing.<sup>68</sup> If we continually avoid conflict, we will never get through the "storming" development phase, thus preventing our organizations from performing up to their potential. Yes, we must not allow the storming to degenerate into personal attacks, but "leaders who cultivate emotional fortitude soon learn what they can achieve when they maximize their followers' well-being instead of their comfort."<sup>69</sup> Allowing dissent, protecting those who voice unpopular ideas, and developing our subordinates' emotional fortitude are not the only leadership challenges we will face.

The leadership challenges surrounding organizational structural changes may be even harder to achieve. "When the capabilities have come to reside in processes and values, and especially when they have become embedded in culture, change can be extraordinarily difficult."<sup>70</sup> Often in our militaries, organizational capabilities and structures have been unquestioned for so long that they, and their outputs, become confused with values. When this occurs, discussions can become polarized rapidly and the debate itself, let alone any subsequent change that takes place, is painful. Leaders can move their organizations through these changes by asking questions rather than providing answers.

We need to expose our people to the reality of the world we live in rather than trying to insulate them from change. By allowing all members of our organizations to become part of, rather than pawns of, the system of change, we can draw out issues that need to be faced and allow them to set goals worthy of their best efforts. "Instead of quelling conflict, leaders have to draw the issues out. Instead of maintaining norms, leaders have to challenge 'the way we do business' and help others distinguish immutable values from historical practices that must go."<sup>71</sup> To successfully adapt our culture, we must understand the fear and pain of change, but still maintain a steady hand on the helm and the pressure on our subordinates to learn and adapt. We need to "communicate confidence that [we] and they can tackle the tasks ahead."<sup>72</sup> Ensuring that we have a diverse organization that reflects the societies we serve can be a strong asset when we seek to make organizational changes.

Our militaries should not be congruent with society, but rather reflect the values and make-up of the societies we serve. For instance, many societies have groups of conscientious objectors or pacifists. While they may provide an important point of view within society at large, their presence within a military community would be destructive. Unfortunately, every



country also seems to have a group of habitual criminals. Militaries are quite justified in trying to eliminate these groups from their ranks.

It is important to note that it is the ideas and values of these groups, not the individuals themselves, that so deeply conflict with the values of our militaries and that we can exclude from our organizational structure. Other than obvious groups like those above, striving to reflect the cultural make-up of the society we serve will help our militaries maintain and develop ties to the people we serve. There may be some justification for refusing enrolment to people who belong to groups that do not share the core values of our militaries, but to exclude people because they espouse different cultural norms or belong to groups not traditionally part of our militaries is unconscionable and may ultimately limit our ability to fulfill our role. “Companies that foster diversity and openness internally—even at the cost of some cohesiveness—may do better in attracting talented, creative employees and encouraging innovative collaboration.”<sup>73</sup> Militaries that can bring innovative collaboration to the battle space will provide their enemies with a significantly more difficult strategic and tactical problem. This is at the core of surprise, one of only two principals of war adopted by all countries.

Healthy organizational cultures can adapt and change to fit changing threats and opportunities. “As long as the organization continues to face the same sorts of problems that its processes and values were designed to address, managing the organization can be straightforward. But because those factors also define what an organization cannot do, they constitute disabilities when the problems facing the company change fundamentally.”<sup>74</sup> The transition from peace to war might be one of those times when the problems facing us change fundamentally. Dramatic changes in the global politic might be another. A diverse and healthy culture will make our military more prepared to provide for the ongoing security of our nation.

## Shifting the Lantern to the Bow

Professional engagement, innovation, ethical clarity, probity, and cultural health: If we can increase our militaries’ functioning in all of these areas during peacetime, we will be better able to implement the principles of war when called on to do so. A significant part of a military’s *raison d’etre* during peacetime is to act as a deterrent to potential enemies so that the use of force is unnecessary. “A deterrent threat...requires that the deterrer both maintain a relevant capability and also a perceived credibility to employ that capability. It is the product of capability and will that deters by threat of retaliation. This ‘product’ is the source of the paradox, well known even to the Romans: *si vis pacem, para bellum* (If you seek peace, prepare for war).”<sup>75</sup> If we allow our military organizations to ossify during peacetime we are, in effect, making it more likely that they will have to be used, since potential adversaries will not see that a credible deterrent exists.

It is time for militaries not only to recapture a prominent place in the development of management and leadership theory, but also to actively examine the developments that have occurred around us and adapt the appropriate elements for use in our organizations. The presented Principles of Peacetime Readiness are an attempt to move us toward that goal. While cultural health appears last in this list of principles, it may be wise to consider it as *primus inter pares*. A healthy culture will allow the dissent required for innovation and the ability to have open and frank debates about ethical values or the composition of our professional body of

knowledge. These debates and discussions can only effectively take place in an organizational culture that values diversity and inclusion and reflects the society that it serves.

In his book *Principles of War*, Carl von Clausewitz included the following comment: “These principles, though the result of long thought and continuous study of the history of war, have nonetheless been drawn up hastily, and thus will not stand severe criticism in regard to form. In addition, only the most important subjects have been picked from a great number, since certain brevity was necessary. These principles, therefore, will not so much give complete instruction to Your Royal Highness, as they will stimulate and serve as a guide for your own reflections.”<sup>76</sup>

A similar need for brevity is claimed in this paper. The Principles of Peacetime Readiness that have been proposed are general in nature and only briefly defined. As was seen when examining the principles of war, different countries will wish to focus on different issues, and therefore give more importance to some principles than others. The realization that the disaster Guibert referred to would come at the cost of an unknown number of lives spurred the development of these principles, and is an omnipresent issue that should help motivate us to adapt our militaries.

There is no claim that an exhaustive list has been presented. The intent is to encourage debate and thought on the causes, rather than the symptoms, of organizational decay, and to provide military leaders an aide-mémoire to use during peacetime when they are evaluating the readiness of their organizations to face an unknown, undefined—and often undefinable—enemy during the next period of war. The principles can help frame this debate, but like the principles of war, are also meant to guide the design and redesign of our organizational structures, how we develop leaders, and the development of our organizational visions and cultures.

The manner in which these principles are implemented is predominantly up to generals and admirals, or perhaps even statesmen and politicians. After all, leadership does begin at the top. Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini observed: “If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the most essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately, this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, [civil] rank, age, favour, party spirit, and jealousy, will have as much to do with it as the public interest and justice.”<sup>77</sup>

In peacetime, this is an even greater issue, and always has been. We need only hearken back to Guibert’s warning to see this. Those of us who are not generals and admirals can but bring forward the debates when the opportunities arise and develop our own work groups and units with these principles in mind. To some extent, there can be some leadership from below; so we end the way we began, with an observation from Christian Dior:

*By being natural and sincere, one often can create revolutions without having sought them.*<sup>78</sup>

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## Annex A – Comparative Principles of War

Canada <sup>79</sup>	United States <sup>80</sup>	Great Britain & Australia <sup>77</sup>	Former Soviet Union <sup>77</sup>	France <sup>77</sup>	People's Republic of China <sup>77</sup>
Selection & Maintenance of the Aim	Objective	Selection & Maintenance of Aim			Selection & Maintenance of Aim
Offensive Action	Offensive	Offensive Action			Offensive Action
Concentration of Force	Mass	Concentration of Force	Massing & Correlation of Forces	Concentration of Effort	Concentration of Force
Economy of Force	Economy of Force	Economy of Force	Economy, Sufficiency of Force		
Flexibility	Manoeuvre	Flexibility	Initiative		Initiative & Flexibility
Cooperation	Unity of Command	Cooperation	Interworking & Coordination		Coordination
Security	Security	Security			Security
Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise
Economy of Effort	Simplicity				
Maintenance of Morale		Maintenance of Morale	Preservation of Combat Effectiveness	Liberty of Action	Morale
			Simultaneous Attack on All Levels		
			Mobility and Tempo		Mobility
					Political Mobilization
					Freedom of Action
Administration					

## Annex B – Endnotes

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- <sup>1</sup> Marie-France Pochna, *Christian Dior: The Man Who Made the World Look New* (Arcade Publishing, Inc, New York, 1994) p. vii.
  - <sup>2</sup> Comte de Guibert, *Écrits Militaires 1772-1790*, préface et notes du Général Ménard (Paris: Editions Copernic, 1976), p. 192. « Si par hasard il s'élève dans une nation un bon général, la politique des ministres et les intrigues des courtisans ont soin de le tenir éloigné des troupes pendant la paix. On aime mieux confier ces troupes à des hommes médiocres, incapables de les former, mais passifs, dociles à toutes les volontés et à tous les systèmes... La guerre arrive, les malheurs seuls peuvent ramener le choix sur le général habile. »
  - <sup>3</sup> Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1992) p. 47.
  - <sup>4</sup> Samuel Coleridge, Quoted in: Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 383.
  - <sup>5</sup> Samuel B. Griffith, Translator. *Sun Tzu The Art of War* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971) p. X.
  - <sup>6</sup> Major General Meille, Commanding the Division (*Objectif Doctrine N° 34: La Division*, Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Enseignement militaire Supérieur de l'armée de terre, Paris, 2003) p. 23.
  - <sup>7</sup> Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1992) p. 55.
  - <sup>8</sup> *Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 2*, HQDT/18/34/51 dated 1995, Army Code No 71564, (Crown Publications, London, England) p. 2-15.
  - <sup>9</sup> Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1992) pp. 43-4.
  - <sup>10</sup> Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade (*Alfred Lord Tennyson: Selected Poems*, Penguin Books, Toronto, 1991) p. 289.
  - <sup>11</sup> Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade (*Alfred Lord Tennyson: Selected Poems*, Penguin Books, Toronto, 1991) p. 289.
  - <sup>12</sup> Paul Lerman; John H. Turner, *One Day MBA* (International Center for Creative Thinking, New York, 1992) p. 3.
  - <sup>13</sup> Maria Montessori, *From Childhood to Adolescence* (Schocken Books, New York, 1973) p. xii.
  - <sup>14</sup> Samuel Coleridge, Quoted in: Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 383.
  - <sup>15</sup> Lanir Zvi, "The 'Principles of War' and Military Thinking," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 16, No 1 March 1993: 2.
  - <sup>16</sup> Henry Lloyd. Quoted in: Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1.
  - <sup>17</sup> General Bronsart von Schellendorf, Quoted in: Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 2.
  - <sup>18</sup> Admiral Sandy (Sir John) Woodward, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1992), xi.
  - <sup>19</sup> General J.M.G. Baril, "Message from the Chief of the Defence Staff," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, No 1, spring 2000: p 4.
  - <sup>20</sup> Chris Argyris, Teaching Smart People How to Learn (*Harvard Business Review* May-June 1991) p. 6.
  - <sup>21</sup> Pope Alexander IV, quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy To Vietnam* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, New York, 1984), p. 85.
  - <sup>22</sup> Judy Pearsall; Bill Trumble, Ed, *The Oxford English Reference Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1996), p.335
  - <sup>23</sup> Gary Hamel, *Leading the revolution* (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 2000), p. 10.
  - <sup>24</sup> Frances Horibe, *Creating the Innovation Culture* (John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd, Etobicoke, 2001), p. 41.
  - <sup>25</sup> Thomas Fogarty, Voices: Inspiring Innovation (*Harvard Business Review*, August 2002) p. 5.
  - <sup>26</sup> Betty Cohen, Voices: Inspiring Innovation (*Harvard Business Review*, August 2002) p. 9.
  - <sup>27</sup> Richard Florida, Robert Cushing, Gary Gates, When Social Capital Stifles Innovation (*Harvard Business Review* August 2002) p. 3.
  - <sup>28</sup> Ronald A. Heifetz, Donald L. Laurie, The Work of Leadership (*Best of Harvard Business Review* 1997) p. 11.
  - <sup>29</sup> Clayton M. Christensen, Michael Overdorf, Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change (*Harvard Business Review* March-April 2000) p. 67.
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  - <sup>31</sup> Chris Argyris, Teaching Smart People How to Learn (*Harvard Business Review* May-June 1991) p. 5.

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- <sup>32</sup> Esther Dyson, Voices: Inspiring Innovation (*Harvard Business Review*, August 2002) p. 11.
- <sup>33</sup> Gary Hamel, Bringing Silicon Valley Inside (*Harvard Business Review* September-October 1999) p. 73.
- <sup>34</sup> Gary Hamel, Bringing Silicon Valley Inside (*Harvard Business Review* September-October 1999) p. 73.
- <sup>35</sup> Harvard Business Review, Voices: Inspiring Innovation (*Harvard Business Review*, August 2002) p. 4.
- <sup>36</sup> Gary Hamel, *Leading the revolution* (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 2000), p. 11.
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